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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX

U.N. Brutality in Katanga

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JOHN H. ROUSSELOT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 19, 1961

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Speaker, we all know about the current war in Katanga between the Katangans and the United Nations. I wonder if we are all aware of the brutal savage-like efforts of the U.N. to subdue Katanga and make her part of the Congo.

I read in the September 15, 1961, issue of the Chicago Daily Tribune a news item which reports actions of the U.N. in Katanga which are utterly shocking. In this report, Richard Williams, a correspondent of the British Broadcasting Corp., tells of an instance where U.N. forces fired point blank at a Red Cross ambulance, wounding the attendants in the ambulance. The U.N. is supposed to be an organization of peace-loving nations whose goal is to achieve peace and tolerance among nations. The actions of the U.N. in Katanga cause one to wonder if the U.N., in fact, is furthering man's inhumanity to man.

In my opinion, every Member of Congress should have an opportunity to read the news item to which I refer. I, therefore, wish to have it printed in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:

U.N. GUILTY OF SAVAGERY, BRITON SAYS

LONDON, September 14.—A British newsman covering the United Nations takeover in Katanga tonight accused U.N. forces of brutal savagery.

Richard Williams, correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corp., said in a report from Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, that the U.N. action was a terrible miscalculation.

Williams, wounded in the foot yesterday during the fighting in Elisabethville, said the U.N. miscalculation had in effect developed into a national war.

POST OFFICE A FORT

Williams said that U.N. troops "have turned the Elisabethville post office into a fortress, partly surrounded by the Katangan army."

"United Nations machineguns on the terrace and balconies of the Red Cross hospital 60 yards away were firing heavily all morning," he added.

"This morning, when a group of journalists approached the hospital, they were greeted by a long burst of machinegun fire from armored cars manned by Irish troops," Williams said.

STREETS DESERTED

"The streets are deserted. Anything that moves is shot at. Armored cars stand menacingly at street corners."

"Few people slept here last night. Heavy machinegun fire spat at the hidden enemy. Mortar bombs burst around us and bazookas tore into offices and private houses when Katangan troops tried to retake the post office."

Williams said that this morning a white painted, clearly marked Red Cross ambulance stalled in the middle of the main square of the capital. The driver and stretcherbearer got out.

"Indian troops in the post office immediately opened fire at almost point blank range," he said. "They [the ambulance

men] collapsed on the road seriously wounded."

"This is the second time in 24 hours I have seen United Nations troops fire on a Red Cross vehicle."

"OBSEVER APPALLED

"All the rules of war have gone by the board in this campaign. This morning the Belgian head of the Red Cross told me he had asked Brig. Singappa Raja, the United Nations commander, to remove all machineguns from the hospital."

"He was told they would stay there. The hospital was a strategic post. It would not be abandoned."

"All foreign observers are appalled at the unrelenting severity of the United Nations assault. I am sorry to say that I have personally seen Indian troops act with the brutal savagery which is quite indefensible."

A Review of Cuba

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, September 19, 1961

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, in the September 1961 issue of Fortune magazine there is a very thorough report about what happened during the recent Cuban affair. The journalist who researched the material for this article for many weeks and who wrote this comprehensive study is Charles J. V. Murphy, the senior editor of Fortune magazine in Washington. The editors of Fortune have stated that they are publishing this account "Cuba: The Record Set Straight," for one purpose—to set the record straight for concerned Americans. In this spirit we should carefully study the many facts and anecdotes which Mr. Murphy has so thoroughly pulled together.

Regrettably, President Kennedy has said about this article:

This is the most inaccurate of all the articles that have appeared on Cuba (August 30 press conference).

It is unfortunate that the Kennedy administration attacks the integrity of the author instead of dealing factually with the matter in hand. I believe that issues and studies are more important than name-calling and play on personalities. I would like to say about Mr. Murphy that he is one of the most experienced, thoughtful, careful senior journalists writing in Washington today. For 20 years his articles, reports, and books have been most highly valued by thoughtful individuals. He is an acknowledged expert in the fields of military strategy, economic policy, and foreign affairs. He has traveled all over the world obtaining material for his writings. His firsthand experiences include accompanying Adm. Richard Byrd on some of his Antarctic expeditions. He has been decorated by the U.S. Government. Three words have always characterized Mr. Murphy's career as a journalist, regardless of whether one agreed or disagreed with one particular

aspect of an article. These are integrity, scholarship, and courage.

Because Mr. Murphy's finding about Cuba deserve the closest study by legislators and editors, I submit this article for the RECORD:

CUBA: THE RECORD SET STRAIGHT

(By Charles J. V. Murphy)

Not long ago, at President Kennedy's daily staff meeting, the special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy, opened the proceedings by noting, "Sir, we have four matters up for discussion this morning." The President was not in a zestful mood. "Are these problems which I inherited?" he asked. "Or are they problems of our own making?" "A little of both," was Bundy's tactful answer.

The exchange revealed a new and saving humility. Some days after this incident, Kennedy addressed the Nation on the subject of Berlin. The ebullience, the air of self-assurance that marked his first months in office had gone. He spoke earnestly to his countrymen but his words were also aimed at Premier Khrushchev, who up to this point had appeared not to be listening. This time Kennedy did get through to Moscow; and any lingering doubt about the American determination to defend Berlin was dispelled by the response of the American people. The President's will to stand firm was clear, and the Nation was with him.

Nevertheless, in any full review of John Kennedy's first months in office, there must be reported a failure in administration that will continue to inhibit and trouble American foreign policy until it is corrected. This failure raises a fair question: whether Kennedy has yet mastered the governmental machinery, whether he is well and effectively served by some of his close advisers, and whether they understand the use of power in world politics. The matter is of vital importance; in the crises that will inevitably arise around the world—in the Middle East, in Africa, in the Far East, in central Europe—the U.S. Government must be in top form, and possibly even, as Kennedy himself suggested, act alone.

Administrative confusions came to light most vividly in the Cuban disaster. That story is told here for the first time in explicit detail. It is told against the background of the U.S. reversal in Laos, which in itself should not be underestimated: Laos, once in the way of becoming a buffer for its non-Communist neighbors, is all but finished; now, in South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, a stout friend of the United States, is under murderous attack by Communist guerrillas; the U.S. loss of face is being felt from the Philippines to Pakistan, and in the long run the damage may prove to be even more costly than that caused by Cuba.

Let us turn back then to the train of events, beginning with Laos, that culminated in the disaster in the Bay of Pigs. Fortune is publishing the account for one purpose—to set the record straight for concerned Americans.

Kennedy, from the day he took office, was loath to act in Laos. He was confident that he understood the place and use of power in the transactions of the Nation, but he was baffled by this community of elephants, parascas, and pagodas. Then, too, he brought to office a general surmise that our long-range prospects of holding the new and weak nations of southeast Asia in the Western camp were doubtful in the extreme. In this respect, he was leaning toward the Lippmann-Stevenson-Fulbright view of strategy. This school holds that U.S. power is over-committed in southeast Asia, and that the proper aim for U.S. diplomacy there should be to reduce local frictions by molding the new states as true neutrals.

The U.S. position in Laos had become acute while Dwight Eisenhower was still in